

**CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT**

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FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE SIXTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Wednesday, 21 March 1962, at 10 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. C. RUSSO

(Italy)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. de MELLO-FRANCO
Mr. C.A. BERNARDES
Mr. RODRIGUES RIBAS

Bulgaria:

Mr. C. LOUCANOV
Mr. M. TARABANOV
Mr. V. PALINE
Mr. N. MINTCHEV

Burma:

U Thi HAN
Mr. J. BARRINGTON
U Tin MAUNG
U Aye LWIN

Canada:

Mr. H. GREEN
Mr. E.L.M. BURNS
Mr. J.E.G. HARDY
Mr. G. IGNATIEFF

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. V. DAVID
Mr. J. HAJEK
Mr. E. PEPICH
Mr. M. ZEMLA

Ethiopia:

Mr. K. YIFRU
Mr. T. GEBRE-EGZY
Mr. M. HAMID
Mr. T. NEKASHA

India:

Mr. V.K. KRISHNA MENON
Mr. M.J. DESAI
Mr. A.S. LALL
Mr. A.S. MEHTA

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

Italy:

Mr. C. RUSSO
Mr. F. CAVALLETTI
Mr. A. CAGIATI
Mr. C. COSTA-RIGHINI

Mexico:

Mr. M. TELLO
Mr. L. PADILLA NERVO
Mr. E. CALDERON PUIG
Miss E. AGUIRRE

Nigeria:

Mr. J. WACHUKU
Mr. A.A. ATTA
Mr. A. HAASTRUP
Mr. V.N. CHIBUNDU

Poland:

Mr. A. RAPACKI
Mr. M. WASZKOWSKI
Mr. M. LACHS
Mr. M. BIEN

Romania:

Mr. C. MANESCU
Mr. G. MACOVESCU
Mr. C. SANDRU
Mr. M. MALITZA

Sweden:

Mrs. A. MYRDAL
Baron C.H. von PLATEN
Mr. G.A. WESTRING
Mr. H. BLIX

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

Mr. A.A. GROMYKO
Mr. V.A. ZORIN
Mr. V.P. SUSLOV

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

United Arab Republic:

Mr. M. FAWZI
Mr. A.F. HASSAN
Mr. A. TALAAT
Mr. M.S. AHMED

United Kingdom:

The Earl of HOME
Mr. J.B. GODBER
Sir Michael WRIGHT

United States of America:

Mr. D. RUSK
Mr. W.C. FOSTER
Mr. C.C. STELLE

Special Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. O. LOUTFI

Deputies to the Special Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. T.G. NARAYANAN
Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (Italy) (translation from French): I declare open the sixth meeting of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament.

There are four speakers on the list for today: the representatives of Poland, the United Arab Republic, Ethiopia and Burma.

Mr. RAPACKI (Poland) (translation from French): The question of general and complete disarmament is becoming ripe for decisions faster than the decisions themselves are materializing; it is from that fact that our task and our responsibility derive.

Poland therefore considers that a draft of the most concrete possible provisions governing the whole of the disarmament process should be taken as the basis for our discussions. Such a draft, prepared by the Government of the Soviet Union in consultation with Poland and the other countries allied to it, has been submitted to the Eighteen Nation Committee (ENDC/2). The soundness of the proposals it contains has already been explained here during our discussions.

At this point, however, I should like to explain the Polish Government's point of view on a question which we have for several years considered to be fundamental for the whole disarmament process: elimination, from the outset, of the threat of a surprise nuclear attack.

Modern armaments - rockets and nuclear weapons - are entirely different from all other types of armament. The nuclear arms race must, by its very nature, be a particularly desperate race. It increases the danger of an outbreak of war to an incomparably greater degree than a conventional arms race.

The fear of a surprise nuclear attack, more than that of any other attack, creates an atmosphere of distrust, fear and tension. The danger of war being started through a mistake or accident has never been so great.

The existence of rockets and aircraft that carry nuclear weapons also profoundly changes the function of control. Formerly, before the second World War for instance, it was possible to discuss the merits and defects of armaments control. Now, reciprocal control of the most modern armaments, which would provide the two sides with precise information on the dismantling of bases and launching ramps, would be bound to encourage an aggressor to make a surprise attack which no control would be able to prevent. On this point the Eastern and the Western experts seem to be in agreement.

(Mr. Rapacki, Poland)

Thus, in view of modern means of warfare, the choice between control of disarmament and control of armaments in fact amounts to a choice between controlled disarmament and an accelerated arms race with increased danger of a surprise attack.

In spite of some new phrases used by Mr. Rusk, the Secretary of State, the desire to transform control of disarmament into control of armaments is still apparent in the United States' position. The interpretation given yesterday to the term "verification" by Lord Home (ENDC/PV.5, pages 6, 7) leaves no doubt on that point.

An attempt is being made to convince us that control of armaments would help to establish confidence and eliminate fear. In reality, it would have the opposite effect. It is from the lack of confidence that the aspiration to control armaments derives. Now control of modern armaments itself can only intensify the danger of a surprise attack, which would inevitably increase mutual distrust and fear. In short, it is a vicious circle.

It is only by eliminating the very possibility of a nuclear attack that a point of departure can be reached for creating an atmosphere of real security and confidence. If we provide for this decisive step as early as the first stage of disarmament, all the problems - I am sure - all the disarmament problems which are now so much in dispute will be found much easier to solve.

The dismantling of bases and of all means of launching and delivering nuclear explosives is the measure that would make any devastating surprise attack impossible, the most practical measure and the one most easily controlled.

But the possibility of a nuclear attack must be completely eliminated. A reduction of the means of delivering nuclear explosives by 30 per cent, as proposed by Mr. Rusk, or even by some higher percentage, would not solve this problem. Either the possibility of a surprise nuclear attack exists, or it does not. If it exists, it hangs over the world threatening the outbreak of war. Such a war, whether 70 per cent or even an appreciably smaller proportion of the present means of delivering nuclear weapons were used at the beginning, would make all limitation quite pointless, and would be no less terrible in its consequences.

What is needed is a radical solution that would immobilize all weapons of mass destruction and consequently render them useless.

(Mr. Rapacki, Poland)

As was shown by Lord Home's statement (ENDC/PV.5) it is considered that such a solution might upset the balance of forces. Well, instead of contesting the principle, would it not perhaps be better to go more deeply into the other Soviet proposals for the first stage of disarmament, and the proposals on control during that first stage - a control conceived broadly enough to provide adequate safeguards for the security of States?

We consider that all disarmament measures must take into account the security requirements of all the parties concerned.

The most important thing is, therefore, to take the first decisive step which will launch disarmament on an irreversible course. That is the key to the whole matter.

Guided by the same desire to secure the most favourable point of departure for general and complete disarmament, Poland is keenly interested in measures which might immediately reduce the danger of the outbreak of war, restrain the arms race and bring about a lessening of tension. This was the purpose of all the proposals submitted to the General Assembly of the United Nations at its fifteenth session by Mr. Wladyslaw Gomulka, the Chairman of the Polish delegation. This was the basic purpose of the Soviet memorandum submitted during the sixteenth session (A/4892).

Special attention should be given to diminishing the danger of the outbreak of war where this danger is particularly great. In 1957 the Government of the Polish People's Republic proposed the establishment of a non-nuclear zone in central Europe. Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic Republic supported this proposal. The establishment of such a zone would make an important contribution to security and the stabilization of peace in a region in which thorny and controversial international problems abound; it is the only region of Europe where claims are being made to territories belonging to other States, the region where the Federal Republic of Germany, growing in strength and enlarging its ambitions, is making increasingly insistent demands for nuclear weapons despite the desire of the peoples to see the list of States possessing those weapons closed. Had the proposal to create a non-nuclear zone in central Europe been implemented at that time, the present situation in Europe would certainly be more favourable.

(Mr. Papacki, Poland)

The idea has not, however, lost its applicability. On the contrary, since 1959 it has gained wider significance; it has become one of a whole series of endeavours to bring about general and complete disarmament. It also acquires greater importance in the light of other similar proposals relating to northern Europe, the Balkans, the Far East, the Pacific region and Africa as well as to other regions of the world.

The idea put forward by Mr. Unden, the Foreign Minister of Sweden, has elicited wide interest and support (ENDC/PV.5, page 33).

A new trend is making its appearance, namely, the trend towards action gradually "to restrict the area of atomic danger", as Mr. San Thiago Dantas, the representative of Brazil, has put it (ENDC/PV.3, page 8).

This in its turn is linked with the universal desire, which is also warmly supported by Poland, to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. Apart from their other functions, non-nuclear zones would mean the implementation of a ban on the spread of nuclear weapons, which, though partial, would be guaranteed by treaties and subject to control.

Where the Polish proposal is concerned, we do not claim that it could not be improved as a result of a joint study of the relevant proposals and suggestions.

Many of those who have so far taken part in the discussion have emphasized the grave concern felt at the announcement by the United States of its intention to resume nuclear tests.

The Polish delegation, like many other delegations, can see no justification for postponing the conclusion of a final agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear tests. All the available information indicates that nuclear explosions are detectable and identifiable without the need for inspection.

To anticipate that doubts will arise regarding the character of recorded phenomena is pure speculation. Such doubts have not arisen for a number of years, or have been dispelled without recourse to control on the spot. Yet there is no reason to believe that the technique of detecting nuclear explosions has regressed during this period.

As for our method of work, it would seem desirable that, parallel with the main subject of our discussions, we should consider the question of the discontinuance of nuclear tests as well as proposals concerning non-nuclear zones, the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the two opposing alignments, the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons, and other means of restraining the arms race and easing tension.

(Mr. Rapacki, Poland)

However, the principal objective, of course, is and remains general and complete disarmament. We are aware of all the obstacles which block the road to that basic objective. We know the economic and social causes of these obstacles. But the possibility undoubtedly exists of ensuring peace, which we all recognize to be the greatest boon of all peoples, of all classes, of every human being.

Mr. FAWZI (United Arab Republic): Mr. Chairman, you will readily note that, as if it were not enough that I am to deal today in my turn with the unyielding problem of disarmament, the shifting fortunes of the seating arrangements have this morning put me in a corner where I can hardly see or be seen by several of my colleagues sitting round this table. But I should not really make a complaint as I am in a good neighbourhood here -- a link, I trust, and not a separation between Mr. Gromyko and Lord Home.

In the preliminary statement I am about to make I shall try, in my inept way, to emulate in brevity the clear and helpful conciseness with which the distinguished colleagues who have taken the floor before me have spoken.

The United Arab Republic, for its part, is deeply thankful for the kind words which have been expressed here by several speakers in welcoming the eight countries which have newly joined these disarmament deliberations. It has been pointed out that these countries are a cross-section of the present-day world and that their presence reflects the fact that disarmament is the concern not exclusively of the great Powers but of all countries, large or small. It has been generously said, furthermore, that these countries bring a fresh perspective to the present discussions and may play a useful role in breaking the stalemate which has so far been obstructing all serious progress on our road to solutions.

Our understanding, in the Government of the United Arab Republic, of the role of the eight new members of this Committee is that they, by joining the other members in this noble though arduous task, have become members of a team of eighteen who should play together in mutual understanding and according to the rules of the game.

While each naturally carries with him the initial position and views of his Government, none does so with the thought of presenting anything which is cut and dried or of adopting a take-it-or-leave-it attitude in relation to those initial views. They understand, and accept it readily for themselves, that each member of

(Mr. Fawzi, United Arab Republic)

this Committee presents its views during our discussions as a contribution to the common fund out of which the whole Committee can together draw material for agreed solutions. Such, in brief outline, is my Government's concept of the role of the eight new countries, which, I wish to add, are not a bloc and not even a group. My delegation, since its arrival here, and to an extent, even before, had found that this concept coincides with that of all these eight countries.

Since the quest for disarmament has now been with us for many years, both before and since the inception of the United Nations, its assumptions and objectives are by now mostly defined. What is not yet sufficiently defined or in some instances not yet defined at all, is how far the States of the world are actually ready and able to go in relinquishing their armaments and in adopting exclusively pacific means as the sole currency in international relations.

All are now agreed in principle that we must add to the attributes of civilization the renunciation of war and the dedication of the world's human and economic resources to peaceful purposes and that, in this atomic age of ours, the new achievements of science should be consecrated to the service, not to the destruction, of the human race. There are many who will recall, at this and related points, that it was not very long ago that, a short while before he was sitting on the ruins of France and of Europe, Napoleon was, with seeming conviction, assuring his contemporaries that war ennobles the people, "la guerre ennoblit les peuples." Many derive good counsel from this and other countless lessons of history and pin their hopes on peace and on all the glory and the honour that it means. It is moreover, conceded, as can be seen, if necessary, from a recent report of the United Nations, that the world can well do without the arms industries and that a relatively small part of the cost of those industries would be adequate to cover the cost of their conversion to peaceful production. Furthermore, most people reject the lethal theory of atomic deterrent as the final word in humanity's approach to the prospects of peace, and realize that it is that theory, rather than the whole universe, which should be exploded.

When, seventeen years ago, the constituent Members of the United Nations, while renouncing war as an instrument for settling international disputes, agreed to stipulate in the Charter that plans be formulated for the regulation of armaments in order "to promote the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic

(Mr. Fawzi, United Arab Republic)

resources", it was earnestly hoped that such an objective would be attained in the not too distant future. This hope is both still alive and on the waiting list for realization. Seventeen years may appear to be too long; yet, except for justified human anxieties in this regard, seventeen years is not too long a time in the life of nations and in the context of the vital implications and harassing complexities of disarmament. Clearly these implications and complexities must be neither overstated nor oversimplified.

On one hand, nobody dealing with this question is entitled to give up hope or surrender to despair. On the other hand, it is part of foresight and more conducive to success to be fully aware of the huge dimensions of the difficulties besetting the road to solutions.

It is infinitely easier to speak about disarmament than actually to accomplish it, and it is easier to speak about than to attain such indisputably valid and relevant objectives as the prevention of surprise attack, the elimination of carriers of atomic weapons, the elimination of foreign bases, and disarmament without insecurity and control without espionage. But, happily, none of that is impossible and, even if it were so today, we can and must make it possible in the days to come.

It was natural that, foremost among the plans for disarmament presented to this Committee, there should be those of the Soviet Union (ENDC/2) and the United States (ENDC/6) respectively. We would not be giving such important plans their due if we formulated detailed and final opinions, hastily made, regarding them. In the meantime, it is gratifying to be able to state that each of them, as well as the draft treaty submitted by the Soviet Government on "general and complete disarmament under strict international control", seems to represent some steps in the right direction. So long, however, as the various plans are not synchronized and do not meet and flow harmoniously together, there can be no agreement and consequently no disarmament.

Furthermore, in order to be effective and of practical value an agreement has to reach at least a minimum degree of concreteness and of applicability.

It was right to hail, on 20 September last year, the joint statement by the Governments of the United States and the Soviet Union of agreed principles for disarmament negotiations (ENDC/5). But, rather than being immediately of any practical consequence, that statement has been little more than symbolic as another indication of the parties' readiness to accomplish disarmament.

(Mr. Fawzi, United Arab Republic)

An effective meeting of minds and of intentions is necessary before any real success can be achieved in this field, a meeting of minds and of intentions which would be translatable and translated, at least gradually, into palpable and constructive facts of life.

There is, for example, a recently oft-repeated assurance by many States, by virtually all States, that they accept general and complete disarmament. Yet, as we all know, the road and the steps leading to that goal are by no means agreed. This condition prevails in relation to control and to several other basic aspects of the problem.

Our difficulties are, moreover, compounded by the persistence of what might be described as a mixture of comprehensible fears and suspicions and an incomprehensible and inadmissible manoeuvring for position in the field of disarmament where no such manoeuvring should have any place.

We all sympathize with and have the fullest respect for the right and the duty of every State to give utmost attention to its security. But a world of general and complete disarmament, were it ever to come about, would be a new world to which we would have to make a new approach. Our legitimate care for national and international security must not be allowed to overrule and to stymie our endeavours to step out of a distraught, overburdened world which is very nearly being frightened out of its wits and crushed under the unbearable burden of armaments into a world in which we shall not have arms of destruction with which to eliminate each other in hate, but kind, human arms with which to hold each other in friendship, a world of common sense, of honour and of hope.

Step by step we must go forward, always forward, together, solving problems, conquering difficulties, allaying fears, banishing suspicions and building up confidence. We must work day and night till we accomplish an adequate, frank and satisfactory agreement on general and complete disarmament. We must immediately agree on the stopping of nuclear arms tests. As the representative of Poland has just said this morning, there is no excuse for delaying agreement in this regard. I repeat, we must immediately agree on the stopping of nuclear arms tests, those tests which the world has condemned and will always condemn and abhor, wherever and by whomever they are made.

(Mr. Fawzi, United Arab Republic)

Last September, almost as a prelude to the Belgrade Conference where two score and more non-aligned countries met in the name of peace, we had the Soviet atomic explosions, to which, as the Committee knows, we took strong exception. One is entitled to ask, indeed one is in duty bound to ask, whether we are going to have as an accompaniment to this Conference and to the work of this Committee another atomic detonation, this time coming from the United States of America, and whether we are going to have, in reply to that, still another atomic detonation by the Soviet Union.

These and related questions are ones which we must ask and must face and must attempt to answer. If we do not do so, we shall be isolating ourselves from the thinking and the feelings of the people of the world; we shall be working here in an isolated room as though we were not on this planet. I would, I am sure, offend the members of this Committee if I repeated half the questions that are being asked these days about these tests and half the strictures that are being levelled at us all for seeming to hesitate in finding a solution or for seeming not to work sufficiently hard, with sufficient resourcefulness, in order to find a means of stopping the tests. I have heard people ask: Is this world of ours going to be a death-trap from which, for the present at least, there is no escape to some other planet? Are the peoples of the world going to be dealt with as cattle and as sheep, to be herded to the slaughter house to be killed one after another or all together?

There might be difficulties and indeed there are difficulties in connexion with the stopping of these tests, difficulties which we cannot ignore and which we have no right to ignore. But difficulties are there to be conquered and not to be surrendered to.

We know that the whole question is connected with vital matters of security, principally the security of two limited groups or a few States. But what about the survival and the security and the rights of the entire human race? To a country like mine it hardly makes any difference on what basis agreement is reached and on which plan such agreement is reached in order to stop atomic tests. It makes absolutely no difference to my country. The main thing is that the tests should actually be stopped. The world would not forgive us and we should not forgive ourselves if we allowed any more tests under any pretext and for any reason whatsoever to take place again.

(Mr. Fawzi, United Arab Republic)

The peoples of the world rightly ask us, or some of us, in this connexion: Have you not already produced enough arms to destroy all humanity? Have you not sufficiently contaminated and poisoned with your atomic arms tests the air we breathe, the milk we drink and the food we eat? Who has given you a warrant to do all this?

We must, furthermore, stop the disease of atomic armament from spreading and becoming a worldwide epidemic. We must try to de-atomize as many areas of the world as we can and if, in connexion with any of these steps, any of us entertains some valid anxieties or feels honestly in need of some safeguards, we must take this into full consideration and do our utmost to meet it squarely and resourcefully so that it will not stand as an obstacle blocking our road to progress.

I ask leave to mention some illustrations which might further help to clarify this point. Some country or countries might feel, perhaps mistakenly but understandably, that by certain steps in the programme of disarmament a military advantage would be gained by others. Such concern cannot and must not be simply brushed aside. It must be taken care of, both out of fairness and if we are to have an agreed disarmament programme. Fortunately, in this connexion, the principle of balanced disarmament is already admitted by all to be valid as well as essential, although its application will often prove to be extremely difficult. To keep this principle in mind would be both indispensable and of great help in getting the accord of all concerned. Nor, to give another example, can we when we try to devise a system of control overlook the concern of some of us lest such control be vitiated by elements of espionage. As long as such concern is genuine, it has to be taken care of.

In these and related respects there will be inevitably many cleavages between the natural need of each State to safeguard its security and the undoubted will of all to accomplish disarmament; and it will be necessary to remedy these cleavages between the requirements of disarmament and those of security. To keep our mind's eye looking exclusively at and into one of these two main aspects would be to doom our work to failure. To keep them -- disarmament and security -- both in mind, to try to co-ordinate and harmonize them would be one of the surest guarantees of success.

(Mr. Fawzi, United Arab Republic)

In this regard, as in all the panorama of disarmament which has been recently unfolding before our imagination, we wish to feel particularly relieved or even encouraged by some principal assurances and clarifications given us by the Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union and the Secretary of State of the United States. It has been gratifying to hear Mr. Gromyko state at the second meeting of this Committee:

"The Soviet Union considers acceptable a decision to discontinue nuclear tests within the framework of general and complete disarmament or on the basis of a separate agreement" (ENDC/PV.2, page 7); as it was equally gratifying to hear Mr. Busk state at the same meeting, quoting from a letter sent to him by President Kennedy:

"The objective should be to define in treaty terms the widest area of agreement that can be implemented at the earliest possible time while still continuing your maximum efforts to achieve agreement on those other aspects which present more difficulty" (ENDC/PV.2, page 16), and that "as a matter of the highest priority" he should seek "agreement on a safeguarded nuclear test ban" (ibid).

It is almost superfluous to say that, like all other peace-loving States, the State which I have the privilege to represent here has been and will always be ready to work for and abide by an agreement that would lead to the attainment of or bring us nearer to our common goal of disarmament -- general and complete disarmament. This has been the position constantly taken by the United Arab Republic, whose President has, either by himself or with the heads of several other States of Governments, proclaimed it in unequivocal terms in Cairo, Bandung, Casablanca and Belgrade and at the General Assembly of the United Nations.

My Government considers it a signal honour and a sacred trust to have been, with the other members of this Committee, assigned by the General Assembly of the United Nations the present task in relation to disarmament. Since this mandate was given us, my Government has tried, as the other members of this Committee must surely have done, to carry it out fully, honourably and to the best of its ability. There is no doubt that we shall all continue to do so in all humility, yet with absolute determination, and that we shall all be provoked to further, redoubled efforts and shall not be merely provoked by such gratuitous talk as that from

(Mr. Fawzi, United Arab Republic)

certain quarters which described our work here, before it had even started, as an exercise in futility. If it be God's will that our endeavours should meet with a measure of success, we shall all be grateful indeed.

Mr. YIFRU (Ethiopia): It is a privilege and an honour for me to be here today and to address this Conference, which has convened to consider the most critical issue of this century. I carry with me to the nations whose representatives are assembled here the high hopes of His Imperial Majesty Haile Sellassie I and the Government and people of Ethiopia that the deliberations upon which we have embarked will not be in vain and that the constant threat of general war and nuclear destruction which hangs over our heads may be lifted for ever.

I am aware of the enormous technical data involved in both the broad question of general and complete disarmament and the immediate problem of the cessation of nuclear weapon tests. However, I do not wish to embark now upon a detailed consideration of these subjects. I will rather limit myself to a few observations on those issues which from the point of view of humanity may very well determine our survival or extinction.

Let me, however, declare at the outset that the Ethiopian delegation will maintain, to the best of its knowledge and ability, complete objectivity on all the issues involved, if for no other consideration than the simple, basic and yet universal aspiration for survival. That is to say, we wish to be spared the destruction and extinction that will be our fate if prompt and effective measures are not adopted to rid the world of the perils that engulf it. Accordingly we shall be true to the facts as we see them. In this connexion we are most happy that the major Powers concerned have the same belief and the same desire, as has been amply shown by the representatives who have already spoken here. Therefore we participate in this discussion with the conviction that all of us assembled here have as our principal aim the preservation of our world and that this will compel all of us to respect facts and to accommodate each other in the solution of those problems where differences exist.

Over a quarter of a century ago His Majesty the Emperor of Ethiopia addressed the League of Nations in these very halls. He spoke then not only for Ethiopia but also for the weak and defenceless everywhere. He spoke against aggression, against injustice, against all abuses of power. Today the small notions of the

(Mr. Yifru, Ethiopia)

world, weak, defenceless and at the mercy of those whose fingers are on the nuclear trigger, speak in the same vein -- in the name of humanity. The words of Emperor Haile Sellassie went unheeded in 1936, and we are all acquainted with the consequences. If today those who are speaking not from positions of military strength but from conviction go unheeded, this time the consequences will not be limited to a simple world war; they will surely mean extinction.

The well-known history of the establishment of this very Committee is indicative of the determination of the entire world to rid itself of the holocaust of nuclear destruction and the ever-growing pit of armament into which the riches of the world have hitherto gone. Indeed, a bird's-eye view of the major resolutions adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations during only its sixteenth session shows this passionate desire overwhelmingly.

Thus by resolution 1664 (XVI) the General Assembly endorsed, for all practical purposes, the proposal of the delegation of Sweden to the effect that countries not possessing nuclear weapons should enter into

"specific undertakings to refrain from manufacturing or otherwise acquiring such weapons and to refuse to receive, in the future, nuclear weapons in their territories on behalf of any other country" (Resolution 1664 (XVI)).

Admittedly, the proposal hinges on the replies of Member States to the inquiry of the Secretary-General and the actions of the Committee. Notwithstanding this fact, practically all States wish to rid themselves of the perils of nuclear weapons, and this resolution is assuredly a positive indication of that.

We were among the sponsors of this resolution. We believe in it firmly as a major contribution to the lessening of international tension and therefore we suggest that this Committee should apply itself to giving it practical life. For our part we shall abide by those provisions that are applicable to us, both in letter and in spirit.

Such is also the purpose and intent of resolution 1652 (XVI). This resolution called upon all States:

"To refrain from carrying out or continuing to carry out in Africa nuclear tests in any form;

"To refrain from using the territory, territorial waters or air space of Africa for testing, storing or transporting nuclear weapons".

(Mr. Yifru, Ethiopia)

It also called upon all States:

"To consider and respect the continent of Africa as a denuclearized zone" (Resolution 1652 (XVI)).

True, this resolution, like the previous one, may not have a binding legal force in the sense that it is not embodied in a formal agreement such as the one we are instructed to produce. Yet, there is little doubt in our mind that this resolution expresses the desire of the world to prevent the transformation of all regions into nuclear arsenals.

This is another area where a practical step can be taken by this Committee. We strongly recommend that this Committee call upon the major nuclear powers to declare their acceptance of this resolution. We are aware that some may argue that partial measures in some areas are not enough and that unless the whole world is rid of nuclear tests and weapons Africa cannot derive any comfort from such partial measures. We know these arguments and we cannot fail to respect them, for it is our own passionate desire to have a world free from all weapons of destruction and war. Yet we have a right to insist that where possible and feasible the measures recommended by this resolution be undertaken. Let me add that were any region to manifest a similar desire it would have our fullest support.

Lastly, General Assembly resolution 1653 (XVI), containing a declaration banning the use of nuclear weapons, submitted by twelve African-Asian States and adopted by the General Assembly, demonstrates the conscience of mankind on this subject. The declaration reads in part as follows:

"1. Declares that:

(a) The use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons is contrary to the spirit, letter and aims of the United Nations and, as such, a direct violation of the Charter of the United Nations;

(b) The use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons would exceed even the scope of war and cause indiscriminate suffering and destruction to mankind and civilization and, as such, is contrary to the rules of international law and to the laws of humanity;

(c) The use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons is a war directed not against an enemy or enemies alone but also against mankind in general, since the peoples of the world not involved in such a war will be subjected to all the evils generated by the use of such weapons;

(Mr. Yifru, Ethiopia)

(d) Any State using nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons is to be considered as violating the Charter of the United Nations, as acting contrary to the laws of humanity and as committing a crime against mankind and civilization" (Resolution 1653 (XVI)).

In this connexion I should also like to cite a resolution passed by the Heads of African and Malagasy States and Governments, who met in Lagos from 25 to 30 January 1962. It reads as follows:

"The Conference of Heads of African and Malagasy States and Governments:

"Appeals to all the nuclear Powers to stop the manufacture and stock-piling of nuclear weapons and all further nuclear explosions anywhere in the world..."

Here again, some could argue that the declaration is empty of legal content as it does not have the signatures of the authorities of State-Members. Possibly, but I hasten to express the doubt that the people who hold such views would wish to challenge the vast majority of the human race, for in such a case the inevitable result would be isolation.

Members of this Committee know the history of this resolution. I am not therefore going to take up time in reciting all that has been said about it. I am, however, bound to say that it is the law for mankind, as it expresses mankind's most cherished sentiments. If there is any doubt about this, it suffices to take note of the fact that the resolution was adopted against the determined efforts of some Powers and that it has already been hailed all over the world. This resolution and resolution 1648 (XVI) firmly express the position of the Ethiopian delegation: no nuclear tests anywhere, for in our sincere judgment there is no security in piling up nuclear weapons. As has been pointed out already, the effect of increasing nuclear weapons is precisely the contrary -- an increase in destructive weapons increases the chances of the destruction of us all. Accordingly, and as we have consistently maintained ever since this subject became an issue, we insist that all nuclear weapons tests be discontinued, and we shall continue to press for that.

We are aware that some people may wish to hold the view that prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons does not solve the problem, that what is urgently needed is their destruction. Once more, we will be only too happy -- as we ourselves support such destruction of nuclear weapons promptly -- to accommodate our

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critics by pointing out to them that there is no contradiction between the two. Our resolution hampers nothing: it only facilitates doing away with the horror of nuclear weapons. Accordingly, we call upon the major Powers to consult with a view to putting into effect what is envisaged in operative paragraph 2 of the above-mentioned resolution.

The lesson, the conclusion as regards these specific subjects is therefore that we should not be technical to the point of losing sight of our goal and that a pragmatic approach may very well lead us to a better result. It is such an approach that compels us to agree with the statement of the delegation of Brazil that:

"The technicians of the nations most advanced in nuclear science are, I believe, agreed on the possibility of effective control of tests under water, in the atmosphere and in the biosphere, without more thorough on-site inspections and checks being necessary. We therefore consider that these tests should be suspended immediately. As regards underground tests, studies should be undertaken without delay to determine the minimum degree of on-site inspection that is essential to ensure that the undertakings given are being fulfilled." (ENDC/PV.3, page 9)

In this connexion we fail to understand why an adequate system of international verification cannot be developed which could be used when national systems of verification were challenged. Is it not possible to devise an international scientific system of verification where an appeal could be lodged to resolve differences in results of national detection systems? It seems to me that this area deserves exploration by scientific experts, for, if the answer is positive, surely the present controversy over detection and verification would fall to the ground, clearing the way for prompt action on the treaty.

On the main subject of general and complete disarmament, the feeling of the human race is equally clear. Certainly it was because of the pressure of world public opinion that the literature of disarmament was recently crowned by the eight Agreed Principles of the two major Powers. It is to us worth noting that there is in fact quite a broad basis for agreement as regards the necessity of control and verification of general and complete disarmament, although, as was amply demonstrated the other day by the statements of the major Powers, the details that separate them are decisive. It is such considerations that compel us to appreciate the statement made at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference of 13 March, 1961. It reads in part as follows:

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"Disarmament without inspection would be as unacceptable as inspection without disarmament. Disarmament and inspection are integral parts of the same question and must be negotiated together; and both must be made as complete and effective as is humanly possible. It must, however, be recognized that no safeguard can provide one hundred per cent protection against error or treachery. Nevertheless, the risks involved in the process of disarmament must be balanced against the risks involved in the continuance of the arms race."

In other words, recognition of the fact that inspection and verification of disarmament are necessary should not blind us to the fact that these cannot be one hundred per cent perfect, nor should it be a burden which in the end may very well defeat our overall purpose and goal. It would not serve to go bankrupt by establishing a gigantic and costly system which would collapse when tested by the realities of national life. To make any system of controlled disarmament work there must be a commensurate act of faith in its success.

I should now like to turn to some of the points that we find difficult to understand in the plans of the two major Powers. We do so not with any desire to criticize but only to understand the issues clearly in our own mind and thereby contribute to the common effort of this Committee. We have one or two points in mind.

Mr. Dean Rusk, the Secretary of State of the United States, has proposed a 30 per cent reduction of the vehicles of delivery and major conventional armaments in point 1, and the transfer of 50,000 kilograms of weapon-grade U-235 to non-weapon purposes in point 2 of his statement (ENDC/PV.2, page 21).

Quite frankly, we are at a loss to understand the basis of the calculations and how they fit in with point 5 of the Agreed Principles (ENDC/5).

In the same way, the draft treaty of the Soviet Union (ENDC/2) envisages the complete elimination of vehicles of delivery, together with the dismantling of foreign bases including rocket, air, naval and the like, plus the troops, and also a reduction of the armed forces of the two Powers to the point of 1.7 million men. For our part we desire and accept the destruction of all vehicles of nuclear delivery. But here, too, it is not clear to us how the test of principle 5 will be met in the sense of balance, particularly in the light of the fear expressed

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by some delegations at yesterday's meeting that all vehicles and armaments condemned for destruction in stage I will not in fact have been destroyed.

With respect to the method of work, as we indicated last week we agree that this be as informal as possible, with the understanding that the cessation of nuclear tests will receive prompt attention, as was agreed informally yesterday.

In our view, an outline could in this way be produced for examination from time to time by the plenary Conference in order to give it final shape. If we, the small countries, are to contribute to the utmost, it is necessary to adopt a method of work which will make it possible to express ourselves on each specific point or points needing settlement; otherwise, general statements will continue to be made until 1 June with no tangible results. In this connexion we would appeal to all members to work on those points where there is agreement and to build upon them. In our opinion it will not do to emphasize disagreement, for if we do so the inevitable result will be failure to meet the request of the General Assembly.

In conclusion, we are aware of the other aspects of disarmament. His Imperial Majesty's appeal to the League of Nations was founded, as is Ethiopia's ceaseless devotion to the cause of collective security, upon the clear recognition of the fact that the weak cannot, alone, defend themselves against the strong, that disarmament itself does not lead to peace but leads only to the use of different techniques to settle disputes, that if peace is to be guaranteed it can be guaranteed only by collective measures. The establishment of the rule of law and the creation of a world order have long been man's most cherished dream. If what is required is the development of an international spirit transcending national boundaries and loyalties, let us strive to this end. The opportunity is still available to us, but if we permit it to slip away we may then have lost our last chance.

U Thi HAN (Burma): As a newcomer to this scene, and also representing what the Foreign Minister of Brazil has termed a non-armed nation, my delegation is highly conscious of the limited role which it can play at this Conference. A conference which has taken in its stride the unfortunate and regrettable decision of France not to participate obviously will not be shaken to its foundations by anything the Burmese delegation may say or do here. Nevertheless, we have come

(U. Thi Han, Burma)

here, at a time which for me personally is highly inconvenient, because we feel that not to have done so would have been to shirk a responsibility which we have to the world, including the 20 million Burmese who inhabit it.

That is the crux of the matter. Things have already reached such a stage that peace and disarmament have long ceased to be the exclusive concern of the great Powers. They have become the urgent concern not only of the governments of all States of the world, but of all thinking individuals in each of those States. The Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union put the matter succinctly in his opening address at this Conference when he said:

"Each year and each month lost for disarmament do not mean merely marking time in the talks; they also mean a headlong sliding towards the red line that separates the world from the holocaust of a rocket-nuclear war." (ENDC/PV.2, page 13)

We are here because we recognize this to be no flight of fancy, and because of our realization that it is the duty of every State, however large or small, however advanced or under-developed, to help check this headlong rush towards the red line and to put it into reverse. It may be that what we can do is not much, but little though it be, we will have failed posterity if we fail to do what is possible.

In welcoming the association of the eight additional countries with the disarmament negotiations, the Secretary of State of the United States said:

"The dreary history of such negotiations shows that we need their help and fresh points of view." (ENDC/PV.2, page 16)

As I have said, we would like to help as far as it is within our power to do so. But if we are to be able to help, we will need to be helped in the first instance. Technological developments have since the end of the Second World War made the problem of disarmament, never a simple problem, highly involved and complex. My delegation, lacking the highly developed technical skills and advice available to some delegations here, may not always be in a position to grasp the full significance and implication of measures proposed or contemplated. I believe that some of our colleagues may also find themselves in the same situation. If our contributions are to attain maximum effectiveness we must have an adequate understanding of these things, and therefore I would, through you, Mr. Chairman, earnestly plead to the technologically advanced countries to keep this constantly in mind.

(U Thi Zan, Burma)

My delegation has given very careful study to the speeches which have been made so far at this Conference. We have been pleased with the sober, business-like note which they have struck and by their restraint and moderation. This, coupled with the fact that we meet under the umbrella of the eight principles which have been accepted by those most directly and intimately concerned with the question of disarmament, gives us hope that a really serious attempt will be made here gradually to broaden the areas of agreement which already exist between the positions of the two sides, finally resulting in a composition of all differences. We are glad that we can make such an observation, because we cannot help but share the view expressed by the Foreign Minister of Canada that another chance may not be given to the world if we fail in this attempt to establish an effective system of disarmament.

The road ahead is littered with difficulties, but we must never be deterred by them, we must never admit defeat. Whatever happens, we must persevere in our efforts until the goal of a disarmed world from which war has been banished forever becomes a reality. Unfortunately the road is also likely to be a long one, and it is extremely doubtful if the world will be able to wait patiently for general and complete disarmament to be delivered in one package. While we work ceaselessly towards this agreed objective, it is essential that we produce some parallel agreements, be they of a specific and limited character, to preserve and strengthen the hope that we are, on this occasion, getting somewhere with this age-old question of disarmament. Failure to reach agreements of this kind in the near future may well mean the end of everything.

As my delegation sees it, the search for disarmament consists not only in looking for agreed ways and means of reducing and finally eliminating existing armed forces and armaments: we must also ensure that our task does not grow while we are busily engaged in looking for a solution. This could happen in several ways. One is by the armed Powers continuing their search for even more destructive types of weapons than those which they already possess; another is by existing weapons, particularly nuclear weapons, being made available to States which do not already have them. In other words, our view is that meaningful disarmament negotiations dealing with what we all agree is the most important question of our day are incompatible with efforts to discover newer weapons of destruction or steps to bring about greater dissemination of nuclear weapons.

(U Thi Han, Burma)

I would like now to deal with the subject of nuclear weapon tests, whose only justification seems to be that they help to fashion newer and better means of warfare. As the Committee probably knows, Burma has been opposed to all nuclear and thermonuclear weapon tests from the very beginning. Our opposition is so well known that we do not consider it necessary to re-state it every time a test is made. We deplore them all, and heartily wish they would be stopped for ever. In the context of this Conference nuclear tests have a very special significance because they could sound its death-knell. We believe that both sides do sincerely want to put an end to such tests, but mistrust and mutual suspicion have so far prevented an agreement from being reached. This is a field in which modern science can be of immense help in detecting violations of the terms of any agreement. If, despite this very favourable circumstance, it proves impossible for the nuclear Powers to agree on control, the prospects of agreement with regard to general and complete disarmament look bleak indeed. The whole world would look on an agreement on the cessation of nuclear testing as the opening of the door to genuine disarmament. We believe it would lead quickly to other agreements. But failure to reach agreement on this might easily bar all further progress. My delegation therefore pleads with both sides to cast aside their mistrust and suspicion and to make a supreme effort to reach agreement. We believe that this is a matter which demands of the nuclear Powers that -- to quote the Foreign Minister of Brazil -- they explore "the limits of compromise consistent with maintenance of the present levels of security" (ENDC/PV.3, page 6), because so much depends upon it. And while this effort is made we appeal to all the nuclear Powers, both present and absent, to refrain from further tests of any description while this effort is being made.

As for the further dissemination of nuclear weapons, my delegation has always supported all proposals designed to ensure that nuclear weapons remain confined to the Powers which now possess them. In particular, we warmly support the Irish and Swedish initiatives in the United Nations with regard to this matter. We believe that this is a question which should be pursued here parallel with the central question of general and complete disarmament, and that an agreement on it should, with great profit, precede a treaty on general and complete disarmament.

(U Thi Han, Burma)

Armaments are often referred to as the barometer of international tension. In the circumstances of today, however, it is equally true to say, I believe, that armaments are themselves a cause of international tension. That is why it is so urgent for disarmament to become a reality, and that is the basic purpose of our being here. But a favourable international climate would undoubtedly be of the greatest assistance to this Conference, and my delegation would accordingly make a plea to all nations to do all they can to keep the international seas calm for the duration of the Conference.

A word about procedure and I will have finished. We agree with the suggestions made by various delegations that discussions should be mainly informal and that the special position and responsibility of the great Powers, and particularly of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States, must be recognized. We welcomed their appointment as permanent co-Chairmen of this Conference and we support the proposal of the Canadian Foreign Minister for the setting up of an informal committee of the whole Conference under the chairmanship, alternately, of the permanent co-Chairmen (ENDC/PV.4, page 18). We also favour the establishment of sub-committees to consider specific aspects and measures such as those I have mentioned and any others. In setting up these sub-committees, also the special position and role of the great Powers must be borne in mind.

Mr. Krishna MENON (India): I am not intervening for a second time in this debate, but I hope the Committee will bear with me if, before I leave this meeting, I submit on behalf of my Government that, if there is general agreement, the two co-Chairmen should now make a fresh request, or whatever it is called, to France to come and join us in these deliberations. There is no question of prestige, no question of pressures, involved in this matter. If we do not make this request we are likely to lay ourselves open to difficulties as we go on, especially in connexion with some other matters we discussed more intimately in another place. I therefore suggest that at all stages it is part of our responsibility to keep on trying. If I may say so, this is not the first time that a walk-out from assemblies by France has occurred. We have made similar attempts in such cases which have been successful -- once in connexion with Algeria and once in other circumstances. Therefore, in the changed circumstances, and if all members of the Committee are in agreement -- which the co-Chairmen can ascertain by consultation -- it is our submission that a fresh attempt should be made in an appropriate manner.

The CHAIRMAN (Italy) (translation from French): If there are no comments, I will consider the proposal made by the Minister of Defence of India as adopted.

It was so decided.

Mr. GEOMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics): In his statement the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia said:

"But here, too, it is not clear to us how the test of principle 5 will be met in the sense of balance, particularly in the light of the fear expressed by some delegations at yesterday's meeting that all vehicles and armaments condemned for destruction in stage I will not in fact have been destroyed."

Our answer is simple. The destruction of such vehicles and armaments should be carried out under strict international control.

The CHAIRMAN (Italy) (translation from French): At the private meeting held yesterday afternoon it was decided to set up a sub-committee consisting of the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States to consider the question of a treaty on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests. If there are no objections, I take it that the Conference approves this decision.

It was so decided.

The Conference decided to issue the following communique:

"The Conference of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its sixth meeting at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of Mr. C. Russo, the representative of Italy.

"The representatives of Poland, the United Arab Republic, Ethiopia, Burma, India and the Soviet Union made statements.

"The Conference decided to set up a sub-committee composed of the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States to consider the question of a treaty on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests and to report to the Conference.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 22 March 1962, at 10 a.m."

The meeting rose at 11.35 a.m.

